7.0217 Philosophy Preprint Exchange (1/253)

Mon, 4 Oct 1993 14:48:18 EDT

Humanist Discussion Group, Vol. 7, No. 0217. Monday, 4 Oct 1993.

Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 12:07:47 -0400
From: rreiner@nexus.yorku.ca (Richard Reiner)
Subject: Preprint exchange update

We apologize for the recent 12-hour service interruption at the
International Philosophical Preprint Exchange, which was due to a
network router failure.

In the future, we will be posting the abstracts of recently submitted
papers to PHILOS-L and NSP-L, and placing them on PHILOSOP's filelist.
However, in a shameless fit of self-promotion, we're giving this first
batch wider circulation.

Here, then, are the abstracts of some of the papers recently uploaded to
the IPPE. I have also appended a copy of our initial public
announcement, for those we have not yet seen it.

Richard Reiner, Coordinator
International Philosophical Preprint Exchange

The International Philosophical Preprint Exchange

Abstracts of recent submissions, as of Sep 27 04:21:33 JST 1993:

Kevin Korb : Monash University : korb@bruce.cs.monash.edu.au
Infinitely Many Resolutions of Hempel's Paradox

What sorts of observations could confirm the universal hypothesis
that all ravens are black? Carl Hempel proposed a number of simple
and plausible principles which had the odd ("paradoxical") result that
not only do observations of black ravens confirm that hypothesis,
but so too do observations of yellow suns, green seas and white shoes.
Hempel's response to his own paradox was to call it a psychological
illusion--i.e., white shoes do indeed confirm that all ravens are
black. Karl Popper on the other hand needed no response: he claimed
that no observation can confirm any general statement--there is no
such thing as confirmation theory. Instead, we should be looking for
severe tests of our theories, strong attempts to falsify them.
Bayesian philosophers have (in a loose sense) followed the Popperian
analysis of Hempel's paradox (while retaining confirmation theory):
they have usually judged that observing a white shoe in a shoe store
does not qualify as a *severe* test of the hypothesis and so, while
providing Bayesian confirmation, does so to only a *minute* degree.
This rationalizes our common intuition of non-confirmation.

I shall demonstrate that all these responses to the paradox are
wrong--granting an ordinary Bayesian measure of confirmation. A
proper Bayesian analysis reveals that observations of white shoes
may provide the raven hypothesis *any degree of confirmation


Robert Pierson : York University : pierson@nexus.yorku.ca
The Epistemic Authority of Expertise

All of us defer to the authority of experts, but to what extent is this
a rational thing to do? How should our cognitive labour be divided
between the layperson and the expert? I argue that expertise is of two
dominant sorts: closed-system oriented and lay-person oriented. The
first sort of expertise is concerned primarily with controlling and
manipulating a discipline's defining set of variables as a closed or
relatively closed system. The second sort of expertise is simply in the
business of "advising" clients. When expert claims are the result of
the first sort, then there is no rational room for lay evaluation of
those claims, and so the layperson must defer to the experts. However,
when experts either extrapolate from their closed-systems to produce
programmes for personal or lay action, or if experts are of the second
sort, then the layperson is rationally obliged to think for herself,
which amounts to nothing more than determining whether the *benefit*
of following the expert's advice is worth the *cost* of doing so.


Steve Fuller : University of Pittsburgh : <fuller@vms.cis.pitt.edu>

The emerging field of "science studies" has finally reached a field
of public visibility. Indeed, it is perceived as a threat to the
future of science. Two prominent works of science popularization --
Steven Weinberg's _Dreams of a final theory_ and Lewis Wolpert's
_The Unnatural nature of science_ -- devote entire chapters to
describing and criticizing science studies. While neither Weinberg
nor Wolpert believe that science studies will warp the minds of
scientists, they do believe that it can have an unsavory influence
on science policymakers who are looking for excuses to trim down
expensive science. I examine the arguments that Weinberg and
Wolpert make on behalf of science and against science studies, with
an eye toward turning their charges into an opportunity for public
debate about the future of science. I especially focus on how
Weinberg and Wolpert mobilize the history of science for their
purposes, and their implicit notions of the "scientific mind" and
what constitutes a "rational" attitude toward science. One notable
feature of their critiques is that they put positivist philosophy
of science and relativist sociology of science -- normally at
loggerheads with one another -- in the same boat as opponents to
the idea that scientists should set the course of their own


Andrea Austen : York University : <aausten@nexus.yorku.ca>
F.H. Bradley and feminist ethics

In this paper I argue for the re-evaluation of ethical idealism
on the basis of its consistency with feminist ethics. Bearing on
the work of Carol Gilligan and others, I outline how standard
moral theory fails to account for the different voice. My paper
takes seriously Gilligan's challenge to the comprehensiveness of
standard conceptions of morality, but goes further to argue that
ethical idealism can accommodate feminist criticism without
excluding issues of justice and impartiality. Finally, I argue
that a thoroughgoing *feminist* ethic must account for both
orientations without relegating the different voice to some form
of moral immaturity or underdevelopment. The bulk of my paper is
devoted to demonstrating that Bradley's ethics meets these
conditions and ought therefore to be re-evaluated as a total
moral theory.




The International Philosophical Preprint Exchange


phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp (Chiba University, Japan)

Coordinated by
Richard Reiner (York University) rreiner@nexus.yorku.ca
Syun Tutiya (Chiba University) tutiya@cogsci.l.chiba-u.ac.jp

With the assistance of
Andrew Burday (McGill University) andy@dep.philo.mcgill.ca
Istvan Berkeley (University of Alberta) iberkele@vm.ucs.ualberta.ca
Carolyn L Burke (York University) cburke@nexus.yorku.ca
George Gale (University of Missouri - Kansas City) ggale@vax1.umkc.edu
Paul Osepa (TDS) osepa@tds.com


The benefits of circulating pre-publication drafts of one's work are well
known: one can learn from the comments, criticisms, and suggestions of
one's peers, and thereby improve one's work; and one can enter into
fruitful dialogues with others doing related research.

The benefits of timely access to pre-publication drafts of the work of
others are also well known: one can gain access to current work in one's
specialty without the delays associated with print publication; and one
gains in a more general sense by participating in a richer, extended
professional community.

However, until now, philosophers have had no organized means of sharing


Introducing the International Philosophical Preprint Exchange

The International Philosophical Preprint Exchange is a new service on the
Internet intended to make it easy for philosophers with Internet access
of any kind to exchange working papers in all areas of philosophy, and to
comment publicly on each other's work.

The International Philosophical Preprint Exchange provides storage for
working papers, abstracts, and comments, and provides a variety of means
by which papers and abstracts may be browsed and downloaded.

Use of the International Philosophical Preprint Exchange is free of
charge, and open to all.

The International Philosophical Preprint Exchange is located at Chiba
University, Japan, through the generosity of the Department of Philosophy
and of Cognitive and Information Sciences, Chiba University. It is
administered by an international volunteer group headed by Richard

Paper submissions are accepted from all, on the sole condition that
papers must be of interest to contemporary academic philosophers. In
addition to original papers, comments on papers already available on the
system are encouraged.


Getting started

Papers and abstracts on the International Philosophical Preprint Exchange
can be retrieved by email, by ftp, and by Gopher. This means that anyone
with Internet access of any kind can use the service. We've worked hard
to make the system as easy as possible to use.

If you need detailed help in getting started, send a piece of email to
the address phil-preprints-service@phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp
containing exactly the following four lines of text:

send getting-started

and a detailed beginner's guide and a list of files available on the
system will be returned to you by email (they will be preceded by a
detailed message acknowledging your request).

Otherwise, just ftp to phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp (log in as
"anonymous" or "ftp"); or point your gopher at apa.oxy.edu or at
kasey.umkc.edu (look under "Science Studies"); or send email containing
mail-server commands to
phil-preprints-service@phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp (the command "help"
is a good way to begin).

We encourage you to upload your working papers--the sooner the better. To
make life easier for the coordinators, please read the submission
instructions available on the system before uploading.

Please send any comments or questions about the service by email to



Accessing the International Philosophical Preprint Exchange:
By ftp: "ftp phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp".
By gopher: "gopher apa.oxy.edu" or "gopher kasey.umkc.edu".
By email: "mail phil-preprints-service@phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp".
Questions: "mail phil-preprints-admin@phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.ac.jp".
To upload a paper or comment: see pub/submissions/README.

Richard Reiner..............rreiner@nexus.yorku.ca..............416-538-3947
Egotism is the anesthetic given by a kindly nature to relieve the pain
    of being a damned fool.
                -- Bellamy Brooks